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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-4474
________________
STANLEY J. CATERBONE,
                                                      
                                                           Appellant
   v.
LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON; MANHEIM TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT;
STONE HARBOR POLICE DEPARTMENT; AVALON POLICE DEPARTMENT;
COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK, i.e. Mellon Bank; SOUTH REGIONAL
POLICE DEPT.; LANCASTER COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPT.; FULTON BANK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 05-cv-2288)
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
____________________________________
________________
No. 07-4475
________________
STANLEY J. CATERBONE; ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP,
                                                     
v.
MR. RANDALL O. WENGER, of the Lancaster County Prothonetary;
MATTHEW BOMBERGER, Office of the Public Defender of
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Lancaster County; JUDGE MICHAEL GEORGELIS, Lancaster County; LEO
J. ECKERT JR., Lancaster County District Magistrate; KELLY S.
BALLENTINE, Lancaster County District Magistrate; MAYNARD
HAMILTON, JR., Lancaster County District Magistrate; DENISE COMMINS,
Lancaster County District Magistrate Judge; RICHARD H. SIMMS,
Lancaster County District Magistrate; STEVEN MYLIN, Lancaster County
District Magistrate; WILLIAM G. REUTER, Lancaster County
District Magistrate; MICHAEL SMITH, Dalphin County District Magistrate;
OFFICER RONALD BEZZARD, of the East Lampeter Police Department;
OFFICER THOMAS GJURICH, of the Lancaster City Bureau of Police;
OFFICER ADAM CRAMER, of the Southern Regional Police Dept.;
CHIEF JOHN FIORILL; OFFICER ROBERT BUSER, of the Southern Regional Police
Department; OFFICER ROBERT M. FEDOR, of the Southern Regional Police
Department; ROBERT BOURNE, of the Southern Regional Police Department;
JOLYNN STEINMAN, Postmaster, Conestoga Post Office; NELSON BREWSTER,
Investigator, of the PA Attorney General Office; OFFICER MICHAEL K.
SCHAEFER; LUIS FURINA; DONALD TOTARO, Lancaster County
District Attorney; DETECTIVE MICHAEL L. LANDIS, Lancaster County
Stanley J. Caterbone,
             Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-04650)
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 26, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  September 30, 2008 )
___________________
OPINION
___________________
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PER CURIAM
Stanley J. Caterbone appeals from the dismissals of two civil cases for his failure
to comply with the District Court’s orders.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate 
and remand to the District Court for further consideration.
I.
In May 2005, Caterbone sued Lancaster County prison and others asserting that his
constitutional rights, shareholder rights, civil liberties and “right of due access to the law”
were violated (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 05-cv-02288).  Several of the Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint and on June 13, 2006, the District Court granted the motions to
dismiss and also dismissed the complaint as to the non-moving Defendants because they
were never properly served.  The following day, Caterbone filed a document which the
District Court construed as a request for leave to file an amended complaint.  The District
Court granted the request and subsequently set a deadline of August 20, 2006, for filing
an amended complaint.  The District Court indicated that it would dismiss the case with
prejudice if Caterbone failed to file an amended complaint by the deadline.  
After granting three continuances, the District Court set an October 15, 2007
deadline, again warning Caterbone that failure to comply would result in dismissal with
prejudice.  The District Court also stated that it would not grant any additional extensions
of time.  On October 15, 2007, Caterbone filed a rambling, sixty-three page “Amendment
to Complaint and Motion for Continuance,” asserting thirty-eight causes of action against
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several dozen defendants and requesting an additional sixty days to file another amended
complaint.  On October 23, 2007, the District Court issued an order denying the request
and dismissing the case with prejudice.  The District Court explained in its order that the
incomplete complaint submitted by Caterbone did not constitute a valid amended
complaint, and that he had failed to file a valid amended complaint in the sixteen months
since he was granted leave to do so.  Caterbone filed a notice of appeal, and the appeal
was docketed at C.A. No. 07-4474. 
Caterbone commenced a second action on October 18, 2006, by filing a complaint
asserting federal civil rights and RICO claims against twenty-five defendants (E.D. Pa.
Civ. No. 06-cv-04650).  Caterbone requested and was granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.  On November 17, 2006, the District Court issued an order directing Caterbone
to file an amended complaint containing a more definite statement of his claims or face
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The District Court also granted
Caterbone’s motion for continuance, placing the case in civil suspense until April 19,
2007.  After granting two additional continuances, the District Court directed him to file a
status report on or before August 31, 2007.  On September 12, 2007, in response to
Caterbone’s status report requesting an additional continuance, the District Court issued
an order denying the request and directing him to serve his amended complaint on the
defendants on or before October 15, 2007, noting that the case had been pending for
nearly a year and that he had not yet served any of the defendants.  On October 15, 2007,
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he filed the same sixty-three page document that he filed in E.D. Pa. No. 05-2288, which
included an identical request for an additional sixty days to file an amended complaint. 
On October 23, 2007, the District Court entered an order dismissing the case because he
had failed to serve his complaint as directed in the previous order.  Caterbone’s appeal in
this case was docketed at C.A. No. 07-4475.  The two appeals have been consolidated for
disposition.
II.
Before we discuss the merits of the case we must first determine whether we have
jurisdiction over the appeals.  Appellees Fulton Bank and Manheim Township Police
Department have filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that
Caterbone’s notice of appeal in C.A. 07-4474 was untimely filed.  Caterbone has filed
responses asserting that the notice of appeal was timely in both cases.  
In a civil case such as this one, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of
the entry of the District Court’s judgment or order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  The
time limits prescribed for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case are “mandatory and
jurisdictional.” Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007).  Both of Caterbone’s
cases were dismissed on October 23, 2007, and he filed notices of appeal on November
23, 2007, or 31 days after the October 23 orders.  November 22, however, was the
Thanksgiving holiday; therefore, Caterbone had until the following day to comply with
the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)-(4). 
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Thus, the notices of appeal were timely filed.  Accordingly, we deny Appellees’ motions
to dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
III.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s
dismissals for abuse of discretion.  Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir.
1992). 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court may dismiss an action
sua sponte if a litigant fails to comply with a court order or to prosecute his case.  See
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).  Before dismissing an action,
however, a district court should determine the propriety of punitive dismissals in light of
the factors outlined in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir.
1984).  The factors are: 1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; 2) the
prejudice to the opponent; 3) any history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the
party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) whether effective alternative sanctions
are available; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.  Id. at 868. Only in the
rarest of circumstances, those demonstrating the most contumacious of conduct, may a
district court dispense with the Poulis factors altogether.  See Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d
1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir.
1994).  We have repeatedly emphasized that the “drastic sanction” of dismissal is
disfavored except in the most egregious circumstances.  See United States v.
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$8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003).
The District Court erred by dismissing Caterbone’s suits without analyzing the
Poulis factors.  While it is true, as Appellees argue, that Caterbone delayed filing his
amended complaints for several months, such behavior cannot be characterized as
“flagrant bad faith.”  See Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 875 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
After all, the District Court granted, and Caterbone relied on, continuances.  Nor is this an
instance where Caterbone abandoned the case (Spain) or where his behavior was so
egregious as to amount to an abandonment of the case (Guyer).  To the contrary, it
appears that Caterbone made a good-faith effort to file an amended complaint.  See
Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1982) (behavior not
contumacious where effort made to comply with court order).  We do not find that
Caterbone’s conduct was so contumacious that the District Court could proceed under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) without analyzing the Poulis factors at all. 
The District Court also improperly dismissed Caterbone’s suit in 06-cv-04650 by
citing Caterbone’s failure to serve process.  As a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis,
Caterbone was not responsible for the service of process.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“the
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . .”); see also Welch v. Folsom, 925
F.2d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (district court erred by dismissing complaint on the ground
that a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis failed to serve the defendant).  Once
-8-
Caterbone filed his amended complaint, the District Court was obligated to appoint a
United States marshal to effect service.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).  In any event, it may be
that the dismissal in 06-cv-04650 was prompted by the same concerns motivating the
court in 05-cv-02288. 
For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s orders dismissing
Caterbone’s complaints and remand the cases for further proceedings.  We emphasize that
we are not holding that the Poulis factors dictate something less than dismissal in this
case; we hold only that the District Court must, at this stage, perform a Poulis analysis to
guide its exercise of discretion.  Given that Caterbone filed identical amended complaints
in both cases, the District Court may wish to consider whether the cases should be
consolidated on remand. 
